CVE-2026-34361

FHIR Validator HTTP service has SSRF via /loadIG Chains with startsWith() Credential Leak for Authentication Token Theft

Published 31 Mar 2026Modified 24 Jul 2026CWE 552

In the Trivy database since at least 24 Oct 2026, 07:11 UTCWhen it arrived before that build is not recorded.

Severity by source

NVD9.3CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N

GHSA9.3CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N

Trivy's own label is CRITICAL. Rated critical by NVD, GHSA.

Description

HAPI FHIR is a complete implementation of the HL7 FHIR standard for healthcare interoperability in Java. Prior to version 6.9.4, the FHIR Validator HTTP service exposes an unauthenticated "/loadIG" endpoint that makes outbound HTTP requests to attacker-controlled URLs. Combined with a startsWith() URL prefix matching flaw in the credential provider (ManagedWebAccessUtils.getServer()), an attacker can steal authentication tokens (Bearer, Basic, API keys) configured for legitimate FHIR servers by registering a domain that prefix-matches a configured server URL. This issue has been patched in version 6.9.4.

Affected packages and fixed versions

Source	Package	Fixed in
maven::GitHub Security Advisory Maven	ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.validation	6.9.4

References

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