critical

CVE-2026-25130

CAI find_file Agent Tool has Command Injection Vulnerability Through Argument Injection

Published 30 Jan 2026Modified 17 Jun 2026CWE 78

In the Trivy database since at least 24 Oct 2026, 07:11 UTCWhen it arrived before that build is not recorded.

Severity by source

GHSA9.7CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Trivy's own label is CRITICAL. Rated critical by GHSA.

Description

Cybersecurity AI (CAI) is a framework for AI Security. In versions up to and including 0.5.10, the CAI (Cybersecurity AI) framework contains multiple argument injection vulnerabilities in its function tools. User-controlled input is passed directly to shell commands via `subprocess.Popen()` with `shell=True`, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary commands on the host system. The `find_file()` tool executes without requiring user approval because find is considered a "safe" pre-approved command. This means an attacker can achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) by injecting malicious arguments (like -exec) into the args parameter, completely bypassing any human-in-the-loop safety mechanisms. Commit e22a1220f764e2d7cf9da6d6144926f53ca01cde contains a fix.

Affected packages and fixed versions

Source	Package	Fixed in
pip::GitHub Security Advisory pip	cai-framework	no fix listed

References

What Attestkeep does with this

Inside your cluster, without you opening a spreadsheet.

KnowsThe scanner refreshes its vulnerability database every six hours.

FindsEvery admitted image is rescanned every 24 hours by default (scan.rescanInterval). When Trivy rates this vulnerability critical for the image's package source, it appears in the image's findings by name. Findings without a fix are left out unless includeUnfixed is on.

Tells youA critical_finding event goes to the channels subscribed to it: e-mail, Slack, Teams, a webhook, Jira, GitLab or GitHub.

RefusesWith a policy that blocks critical findings, a pod with this image is refused at admission, a rollback to it included. Pods already running are not evicted.

RecordsEach decision is recorded with the policy that ran and its hash, then sealed under a signed checkpoint.

Try Attestkeep

Read the docs