critical

CVE-2026-23947

Orval has a code injection via unsanitized x-enum-descriptions in enum generation

Published 20 Jan 2026Modified 17 Jun 2026CWE 77, 94

In the Trivy database since at least 24 Oct 2026, 07:11 UTCWhen it arrived before that build is not recorded.

Severity by source

NVD9.8CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

GHSA9.3CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Trivy's own label is CRITICAL. Rated critical by NVD, GHSA.

Description

Orval generates type-safe JS clients (TypeScript) from any valid OpenAPI v3 or Swagger v2 specification. Versions prior to 7.19.0 until 8.0.2 are vulnerable to arbitrary code execution in environments consuming generated clients. This issue is similar in nature to CVE-2026-22785, but affects a different code path in @orval/core that was not addressed by CVE-2026-22785's fix. The vulnerability allows untrusted OpenAPI specifications to inject arbitrary TypeScript/JavaScript code into generated clients via the x-enumDescriptions field, which is embedded without proper escaping in getEnumImplementation(). I have confirmed that the injection occurs during const enum generation and results in executable code within the generated schema files. Orval 7.19.0 and 8.0.2 contain a fix for the issue.

Affected packages and fixed versions

Source	Package	Fixed in
npm::GitHub Security Advisory npm	@orval/core	8.0.2, 7.19.0

References

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