critical

CVE-2024-32644

Evmos transaction execution not accounting for all state transition after interaction with precompiles

Published 19 Apr 2024Modified 17 Jun 2026CWE 662

In the Trivy database since at least 24 Oct 2026, 07:11 UTCWhen it arrived before that build is not recorded.

Severity by source

NVD9.1CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

GHSA9.1CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

Trivy's own label is CRITICAL. Rated critical by NVD, GHSA.

Description

Evmos is a scalable, high-throughput Proof-of-Stake EVM blockchain that is fully compatible and interoperable with Ethereum. Prior to 17.0.0, there is a way to mint arbitrary tokens due to the possibility to have two different states not in sync during the execution of a transaction. The exploit is based on the fact that to sync the Cosmos SDK state and the EVM one, we rely on the `stateDB.Commit()` method. When we call this method, we iterate though all the `dirtyStorage` and, **if and only if** it is different than the `originStorage`, we set the new state. Setting the new state means we update the Cosmos SDK KVStore. If a contract storage state that is the same before and after a transaction, but is changed during the transaction and can call an external contract after the change, it can be exploited to make the transaction similar to non-atomic. The vulnerability is **critical** since this could lead to drain of funds through creative SC interactions. The issue has been patched in versions >=V17.0.0.

Affected packages and fixed versions

Source	Package	Fixed in
go::GitHub Security Advisory Go	github.com/evmos/evmos/v16, github.com/evmos/evmos/v5, github.com/evmos/evmos/v6 and 6 more	17.0.0

Show all 9 entries from 1 source

Source	Package	Fixed in
go::GitHub Security Advisory Go	github.com/evmos/evmos/v16	17.0.0
go::GitHub Security Advisory Go	github.com/evmos/evmos/v5	no fix listed
go::GitHub Security Advisory Go	github.com/evmos/evmos/v6	no fix listed
go::GitHub Security Advisory Go	github.com/evmos/evmos/v7	no fix listed
go::GitHub Security Advisory Go	github.com/tharsis/evmos	no fix listed
go::GitHub Security Advisory Go	github.com/tharsis/evmos/v2	no fix listed
go::GitHub Security Advisory Go	github.com/tharsis/evmos/v3	no fix listed
go::GitHub Security Advisory Go	github.com/tharsis/evmos/v4	no fix listed
go::GitHub Security Advisory Go	github.com/tharsis/evmos/v5	no fix listed

References

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