GHSA-xgh2-jgvm-8g78
Unsigned ID tokens (alg none) accepted, allowing authentication bypass in the id_token flow
Sévérité par source
Aucune source ne donne de score CVSS.
Le label propre à Trivy est CRITICAL. Critique selon Ruby Advisory DB.
Description
### Impact omniauth_oidc 1.0.0 and 1.0.1 verified an ID token with whichever signing algorithm the token's own header named, unless `client_signing_alg` was configured. Because the header is controlled by whoever produces the token, an unsigned token with `"alg": "none"` passed signature verification. Applications that use `response_type: "id_token"` (the implicit flow) are affected. In that flow the ID token arrives in the callback request parameters, so an attacker can start a login in their own browser to obtain a valid `state` and `nonce`, then send the callback an unsigned ID token carrying the victim's `sub`. The callback completes with the victim's identity, which allows full account takeover in the host application. Applications that use the default authorization code flow (`response_type: "code"`) are not exploitable this way, because the ID token is obtained directly from the provider's token endpoint. Versions before 1.0.0 used a different JWT library that rejects `alg: none` when a key is supplied, and are not affected. ### Patches Fixed in 1.1.0. The accepted algorithms now come only from configuration, and `none` is always rejected. ### Workarounds Set `client_signing_alg` to the algorithm your provider signs ID tokens with (for example `client_signing_alg: "RS256"`), or use the default `response_type: "code"` flow.
Paquets affectés et versions corrigées
| Source | Paquet | Corrigé en |
|---|---|---|
| rubygems::Ruby Advisory Database | omniauth_oidc | >= 1.1.0 |