CVE-2026-44336
PraisonAI MCP `tools/call` path-traversal => RCE via Python `.pth` injection
Sévérité par source
Le label propre à Trivy est CRITICAL. Critique selon NVD, GHSA.
Description
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.34, PraisonAI's MCP (Model Context Protocol) server (praisonai mcp serve) registers four file-handling tools by default — praisonai.rules.create, praisonai.rules.show, praisonai.rules.delete, and praisonai.workflow.show. Each accepts a path or filename string from MCP tools/call arguments and joins it onto ~/.praison/rules/ (or, for workflow.show, accepts an absolute path) with no containment check. The JSON-RPC dispatcher passes params["arguments"] blind to each handler via **kwargs without validating against the advertised input schema. By setting rule_name="../../<some-path>" an attacker walks out of the rules directory and writes any file the running user can write. Dropping a Python .pth file into the user site-packages directory escalates this primitive to arbitrary code execution in any subsequent Python process the user spawns — the next praisonai CLI invocation, an IDE script run, the user's python REPL, or any background Python service. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.34.
Paquets affectés et versions corrigées
| Source | Paquet | Corrigé en |
|---|---|---|
| pip::GitHub Security Advisory pip | praisonai | 4.6.34 |