Vulnérabilités / CVE-2026-40324

critique

CVE-2026-40324

ChilliCream GraphQL Platform: Utf8GraphQLParser Stack Overflow via Deeply Nested GraphQL Documents

Publiée Modifiée CWE 674
Dans la Trivy database depuis au moins le 24 oct. 2026, 07:11 UTCLa date d'entrée avant ce build n'est pas enregistrée.

Sévérité par source

GHSA9.1CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

Le label propre à Trivy est CRITICAL. Critique selon GHSA.

Description

Hot Chocolate is an open-source GraphQL server. Prior to versions 12.22.7, 13.9.16, 14.3.1, and 15.1.14, Hot Chocolate's recursive descent parser `Utf8GraphQLParser` has no recursion depth limit. A crafted GraphQL document with deeply nested selection sets, object values, list values, or list types can trigger a `StackOverflowException` on payloads as small as 40 KB. Because `StackOverflowException` is uncatchable in .NET (since .NET 2.0), the entire worker process is terminated immediately. All in-flight HTTP requests, background `IHostedService` tasks, and open WebSocket subscriptions on that worker are dropped. The orchestrator (Kubernetes, IIS, etc.) must restart the process. This occurs before any validation rules run — `MaxExecutionDepth`, complexity analyzers, persisted query allow-lists, and custom `IDocumentValidatorRule` implementations cannot intercept the crash because `Utf8GraphQLParser.Parse` is invoked before validation. The `MaxAllowedFields=2048` limit does not help because the crashing payloads contain very few fields. The fix in versions 12.22.7, 13.9.16, 14.3.1, and 15.1.14 adds a `MaxAllowedRecursionDepth` option to `ParserOptions` with a safe default, and enforces it across all recursive parser methods (`ParseSelectionSet`, `ParseValueLiteral`, `ParseObject`, `ParseList`, `ParseTypeReference`, etc.). When the limit is exceeded, a catchable `SyntaxException` is thrown instead of overflowing the stack. There is no application-level workaround. `StackOverflowException` cannot be caught in .NET. The only mitigation is to upgrade to a patched version. Operators can reduce (but not eliminate) risk by limiting HTTP request body size at the reverse proxy or load balancer layer, though the smallest crashing payload (40 KB) is well below most default body size limits and is highly compressible (~few hundred bytes via gzip).

Paquets affectés et versions corrigées

SourcePaquetCorrigé en
nuget::GitHub Security Advisory NuGetHotChocolate.Language, hotchocolate.language12.22.7, 13.9.16, 14.3.1, 15.1.14
Afficher les 2 entrées d'une source
SourcePaquetCorrigé en
nuget::GitHub Security Advisory NuGetHotChocolate.Language12.22.7, 13.9.16, 14.3.1, 15.1.14
nuget::GitHub Security Advisory NuGethotchocolate.language12.22.7, 13.9.16, 14.3.1, 15.1.14

Références

Les 14 références

Vulnerability data compiled from the Trivy vulnerability database (trivy-db, Aqua Security, Apache License 2.0), which aggregates third-party advisories. CVE records are published by The MITRE Corporation under the CVE Terms of Use; CVE is a trademark of MITRE. This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD. Severity, titles and advisory data from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0), Red Hat security data (CC BY 4.0) and the other sources linked on each entry. Entries may be summarised or re-formatted; the linked original is the authoritative record.